THE consumer price index in the United States may be the most closely watched economic barometer in the world. Yet in recent years, as the public and the media have paid increasing attention to the monthly CPI announcements, more and more economists and officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the way the CPI measures inflation. The construction of price indexes, once an arcane subject used to torture graduate students, is now a subject debated in the halls of Congress and discussed on the nightly television news. In the wake of the stunning recent gyrations in the CPI inflation rate, this seems an opportune time to reexamine the index-and especially its treatment of housing, which has been so much in the public eye of late.
CPI uses base-period weights (a Laspeyres index). The PCE deflator covers the entire population, while the CPI is for only urban (about 80 percent of the population).' The list of differences could go on, as could a recitation of the multifaceted "index number problem." But despite all this, the two indexes have on average given very similar measures of inflation over a long historical period. The first column of the table shows that over a thirty-year period ending in 1977 the compound annual inflation rates implied by the two indexes are less than 0.1 percentage point apart. This is perhaps not surprising because most of the components of the PCE deflator are price series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. However, the close correspondence has vanished in recent years. In 1977 the CPI registered 1 point more inflation than the PCE deflator. In 1978 the gap was about 11/2 points, with the CPI high again. The problem really became acute during 1979, when the CPI rate of inflation exceeded the PCE rate of inflation by almost 3 points, and during The real issue is whether to use a fixed market basket or an evolving one. As everyone who has ever been a graduate student of economics knows, a Laspeyres index (such as the CPI) tends to overstate inflation relative to a "true" cost-of-living index while a Paasche index (such as the PCE deflator) tends to understate it. The reason is simple to explain. When different prices rise at different rates, consumers have the opportunity to escape part of the burden of inflation by buying substitutes for the goods whose prices are escalating most rapidly. The Laspeyres index ignores this possibility and therefore exaggerates the utility loss from inflation. The Paasche index assumes, equally incorrectly, that these substitutions entail no loss of satisfaction, and hence understates the burden of inflation.
Since the CPI is a Laspeyres index and the PCE deflator is a Paasche index, we should not be surprised if the former shows higher inflation than the latter. (The comparison is not a clean one, however, because the two market baskets differ.) This has been known for years-and has been thought unimportant. There was probably good reason to think so because the first column of table I shows that the CPI rose only trivially faster than the PCE deflator from 1947 to 1977.
A cleaner comparison between Paasche and Laspeyres indexes is obtained by looking at the PCE deflator and a fixed-weight PCE deflator. The compound annual rate of increase of the latter between 1958 (when it began) and 1977 was 3.71 percent while that of the former was 3.80 percent. It is hard to take this difference seriously. But recent performance appears to have departed from this pattern. The rate of increase of the fixed-weight PCE deflator exceeded that of the conventional PCE deflator by 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, and 0.8 percentage point in 1977, 1978, 1979 , and the first half of 1980, respectively (see table 1 ).
These differences, however, reflect more than the pure difference between a Laspeyres and a Paasche index. To understand why, it is necessary to introduce some of the arithmetic of price indexes. Begin with the simplest case, that of a fixed-weight index such as the CPI or the fixedweight PCE deflator. Such an index is a weighted average of its components. With Pt denoting the overall index and Pit the components, the expression is Thus to isolate the pure effect of commodity substitution, that is, of changing weights, one must look at the difference between the rates of change of the fixed-weight PCE deflator (equation 3) and the PCE chain index (the first sum in equation 7).
Recent rates of change of all three versions of the PCE deflator are shown in table 2. It is clear from these numbers that only about half the recent discrepancies between the conventional and fixed-weight PCE deflators can be traced to commodity substitution. The remainder reflects changes in purchasing patterns stemming from other sources. (Compare the last two columns.) It is notable nonetheless that a good deal of the difference between the CPI and the PCE deflator is accounted for by the weights on food and gasoline-commodities whose relative prices were changing rapidly-as can be seen in the components of the second row in table 3. This table is an aggregated, and drastically reorganized, version of the BEA's quarterly reconciliation of the two indexes. The first and last two rows indicate the gap that needs to be explained; the remaining items provide the explanation.
Look again at the second row in table 3, which shows the portion of each year's discrepancy that can be explained by differences in weighting. During 1978, of the 1.33 percentage points difference between the two in-flation rates, differences in weighting schemes accounted for 0.63 percentage point, about half the total. Food was the major item. Between 1977:4 and 1978:4 there was essentially no growth of real expenditures on food. As a result, the proportion of real consumer spending devoted to food fell from 0.19 to 0.1 8-a large change in weight in just a single year.
In 1979 differences in weighting again accounted for roughly one-half of the discrepancy between the CPI and PCE rates of inflation: 1.43 percentage points out of a total of 2.90. This time energy held center stage. Indeed, the story is even more specific than that-it focuses almost entirely on gasoline. Although gasoline rose in price by 51 percent, absolute spending on gasoline in 1972 dollars dropped 11 percent. Consequently, the weight of gasoline in total real consumption fell from 3.2 percent to 2.8 percent. Of the 1.43 percentage points attributable to differences in weighting, gasoline alone accounted for 1.40 percentage points. Much the same story was repeated in the first half of 1980. Although different weights accounted for less than one-third of the discrepancy between the two measures of inflation-1.10 points out of 3.75 points-gasoline weights alone were sufficient to account for 1.65 points.
In brief, the period from 1978 on has been one of those rare times in which substantial differences between a Laspeyres index and a Paasche index are expected to arise. Measuring the recent inflation with a Laspeyres index (such as the CPI) is bound to give a more pessimistic view of what has happened than one could obtain with a Paasche index (such as the PCE deflator) because consumers have found substitutes for the items that have inflated most rapidly-food and energy.
Before leaving the weighting issue, one further aspect of the arithmetic of price indexes is important enough to be noted here. The inflation rate recorded by any price index is a weighted average of the inflation rates of its individual components. Unless the index is a geometric weighted average-and none of the officially published indexes are-these weights will not be constant over time, even in a Laspeyres index such as the CPI. It is easy to see why this is so. The rate of change of the CPI is given by a formula like equation 3. The CPI and the PCE deflator treat homeownership costs very differently. Table 3 shows how much of the difference between the CPI and PCE rates of inflation was attributable to conceptual differences between the two indexes during 1978-80. For example, during the first half of 1980 differences in coverage led the CPI to show 21/2 points more inflation than the PCE deflator. In each period more than all of this difference came from the disparate treatments of homeownership in the two indexes; other differences in coverage actually led the CPI to show less inflation. If the BLS used the BEA concept of imputed rent rather than its own concept of homeownership costs, the CPI would have shown 1.1 points less inflation in 1978, 1.8 points less in 1979, and a whopping 3.5 points less inflation during the first half of 1980.
Should the treatment of homeownership costs in the CPI be revised? And, if so, how? Would alternative approaches lead to a less volatile index than we now have? To answer these questions, I first explain the current methodology of the CPI and discuss ways of improving the homeownership index within the confines of its current conceptual basis. I then turn to entirely different conceptual approaches to the measurement of homeownership costs-approaches that seem to have more economic appeal.
How the CPI Measures Homeownership Costs5
The CPI, in roughly its current form, dates back to 1921. But purchases of new houses were not included in the original market basket. In 1940, when the market basket was revised, the index was upgraded and monthly publication began; but new homes were still not included. Only in the major revision of the CPI in 1953 did purchase of a new home come to be considered part of the standard market basket. The treatment of homeownership costs today is very similar to what it was when they first entered the index in 1953. Possible changes were considered, but rejected, as part of the last major CPI revision in 1978, despite staff recommendations to the contrary.
The current treatment of homeownership costs by the BLS can best be understood if it is remembered that the CPI is not a cost-of-living index, although it is often used as such.6 Instead, the CPI is an index of current purchase prices, which draws no distinction between durable goods and nondurable goods. The purchase of a new house, and the mortgage that goes along with it, is treated just like the purchase of a television set or a sweet potato, despite the fact that durable goods are consumed (and hence yield utility) only gradually over time. However, the BLS prices home purchases, not service flows. (I return to this below.) The weighting issue is probably unresolvable, given this conceptual treatment, because deciding whether to include or exclude resales is the same as deciding whether the seller of an existing house earns income from the sale or makes a negative expenditure. Standard CPI concepts call for ignoring the sale if it is construed as an income source, but including it if it is construed as a negative expenditure. I submit that the distinction between earning positive income and making negative expenditures is extremely subtle.
Once a weight for home purchase is established, the next step is to derive a house price index to which this weight can be applied. The BLS now constructs its house price index from data on sales of houses with Federal Housing Administration financing. There are serious problems with these data. According to the BLS, "FHA-insured housing constitutes a small and unrepresentative segment of the market. In 1973, these FHAguaranteed purchases represented only about 6 percent of the home purchase market."9 One reason for this is that the FHA mortgage ceiling, which is now $89,500, effectively eliminates all higher-priced housing from consideration. Another is that some areas (such as the Northeast) have very few FHA transactions. Each of these probably biases the rate of change of house prices, but possibly in opposite directions.10 The truncation problem caused by the FHA mortgage ceiling is obvious. Even though the ceiling is periodically adjusted upward, preliminary work by the BLS suggests that this may have been a serious source of downward bias in recent years.11 On the other hand, underrepresentation of the Northeast probably biases the home price index upward. If it is true, as many observers of the housing market suspect-that lower-priced homes have had faster rates of appreciation than higher-priced homes in recent yearsthen this, too, would impart an upward bias to the rate of change of the CPI home price index. 12 On balance, while the potential biases are great, it is hard to guess how severe they may be or even in which direction they may go. In addition to the large potential bias, the small sample size in many cells makes sampling 9. BLS, The Conslunmer Price Inidex, p. 13. 10. In addition, processing delays mean that the CPI home-purchase index often lags several months behind the actual data.
11. John S. Greenlees, "Hedonic Indexes of Home Purchase Prices: Preliminary Report," Bureau of Labor Statistics (forthcoming).
12. This is stressed, for example, by Greenlees (ibid).
variance in the FHA data quite large and requires frequent imputations. A better source of data on house prices thus seems imperative. The BLS staff is, incidentally, well aware of the problems with the FHA data.
MORTGAGE COSTS
The other major component of the homeownership index-and by far the most troublesome one-is "contracted mortgage interest costs," a component that combines the home purchase prices just explained with an estimated mortgage interest rate.
To develop a representative mortgage interest rate, the BLS collects quotations from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for mortgages closed during the first five business days of each month, and uses these quotations to construct a mortgage interest rate index for the following month.13 A one-month delay is built into this procedure: the July index records mortgages closed in June, and so on. There is no particular reason, other than historical inertia, for this data-processing lag.
But there is another, longer lag between changes in mortgage rates and their appearance in the CPI that is not so easily avoided. Mortgages closed in June probably correspond to mortgage commitments made mostly in March, April, and May. On average, the closings lag behind commitments by about two months; but the corresponding mortgage rates need not follow this lag mechanically. When rates are rising, April commitments closed in June will typically be at April interest rates. But when rates are falling it is more typical for banks to lower the rate to the current market rate; April commitments closed in June would carry the June interest rate. Thus the CPI mortgage interest rate index, which properly includes closing rates rather than commitments, may fall much more rapidly than it rises.14 The two lags in combination mean that changes in the CPI mortgage interest rate index lag behind changes in market interest rates by about three months on average.
13. The BLS does this for each of 240 cells: 40 geographical areas, 3 down payment classes, and a distinction between mortgages on new and existing homes. These conventional mortgages take 86.5 percent of the weight. The remaining 13.5 percent goes to the FHA and VA ceiling rates.
14. The July 1980 index provides an outstanding example. The mortgage interest rate index fell at an annual rate of 48 percent from June to July. This was enough to make the homeownership component of the CPI fall at an annual rate of 17 percent and cause the all-items index to be virtually unchanged despite rising prices of many other goods and services.
The procedure the BLS uses to attach a weight to their mortgage cost index seems quite odd. During the survey year, the BLS recorded the interest payments (not including amortization) that would be due over the first half of the lifetime of each new mortgage. These future contractual mortgage payments were simply added, with no discounting. Summing these payments across all units in the survey led to the weight for "contracted mortgage interest cost" in the CPI, which is thus highly dependent on the interest rates that prevailed during the base period.
An But before I declare the BLS's problem solved, I should note that the CPI rent index is probably not appropriate for imputing rents to owneroccupied dwellings. The mix of housing types that are rented is very different in many respects (location, size, number of rooms, age, numbers of houses and apartments, and so on) from the mix of housing types that are owner-occupied. There is therefore no reason to believe that the levels of rents on rented dwellings are good proxies for imputed rent levels on owner-occupied dwellings. The story is less clear, however, for growth rates. The factor inputs used to build and maintain rented dwellings are, for the most part, the same as the factor inputs used to build and maintain owner-occupied dwellings. Thus if Tobin's "q" for rented houses and his "q" for owner-occupied houses were both constant at unity, there would be good reason to think that the growth rate of a properly weighted index of rents would approximate quite well the growth rate of imputed rents on owner-occupied dwellings. However, the two versions of q undoubtedly diverge from unity quite frequently, and need not move together in the short run. Thus rental equivalence is not without its perils.
In brief, although rental equivalence may be the conceptually correct approach, there are potentially serious problems in implementing it empirically by using directly observed rents. These are problems that the BLS should be and is working on. Specifically, answers are needed to the following questions. How good is the CPI rent index as an index of rental rates on rented dwellings? How well does an index of observed rental units serve as a proxy for the behavior of imputed rents on owner-occupied housing; that is, do the q on the two types of dwellings move more or less together? (It is easy to think of reasons why they might not-changes 
Measuring homeownership costs by a user-cost concept is another alternative that the BLS has considered. User cost was developed by Dale
Jorgenson for a precisely analogous problem: industrial capital is normally purchased, not rented, and hence market rental rates were not available. Jorgenson's user cost of capital was meant to represent the rental rates that capital goods would command if they were rented. On the surface, it is not hard to modify Jorgenson's ideas for the case of housing. But, once again, there are difficulties in implementing it empirically.
To "rent" their homes, homeowners "pay" each month: mortgage interest on the funds they have borrowed, implicit interest (opportunity cost) on the equity in their houses (which they could invest elsewhere), property taxes and insurance, maintenance and repairs. As offsets to these expenditures, homeowners receive (in addition to the service yield of their homes) capital gains (or losses) net of any depreciation that occurs, and savings on their personal income taxes due to the favored treatment of owner-occupied housing in the tax code. In the appendix to this paper the interest, tax, and capital gains components of user cost are shown to be ( 
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where t = time elapsed since the house was purchased C(t) = user cost in month t P(t) = price of the house ii = personal income tax rate (assumed to be constant through time) r *(t) = opportunity cost of funds in month t r = mortgage interest rate (assumed to be constant through time) T(t) = property tax rate (percent of true market value) = depreciation rate (assumed to be constant through time) r(t) = accrued capital gains rate in month t V = original face value of the mortgage T = duration of the mortgage. Equation 9 differs from the standard user-cost formulation that is so familiar from the investment literature in two important respects. The first is that the equation includes actual ex post realized capital gains on the house rather than ex ante expected gains. This is appropriate because the objective is to develop a series representative of what it actually cost to own a particular house for the month under consideration, not to ascertain the relative price that should guide investment decisions. The second is the addition of the last term in 9, which merits discussion because it helps illuminate some of the issues.
Suppose initially that observed market rates on home mortgages are used as a proxy for the opportunity cost of funds.19 For new mortgages (t 0 O), the last term drops out because r* (0) = r. An issue arises, however, for old mortgages. Suppose also that interest rates have risen since the mortgage was taken out, so that r* (t) exceeds r and the last term in 9 is negative, implying that user cost is below what the standard formulation suggests. Why? The reason is that the standard user-cost formula charges homeowners the current market interest rate, r* (t), on both the funds they borrow from themselves (their equity in the houses) and the funds they borrow from the bank (their outstanding mortgage balances). But, in fact, while homeowners do implicitly pay r* (t) on their own equity, they do not pay r* (t) to the bank. The bank is locked into collecting r for the life of the mortgage. So when interest rates rise, homeowners receive part of the financing at a cheaper rate than they would in a world in which mortgage rates were renegotiable every period. Conversely, if interest rates fall (r > r* (t) ), homeowners will pay more for credit than they would in a spot mortgage market unless they choose to refinance and bring r down to r* (t). This is the meaning of the last term in 9.
Other practical issues arise in trying to make 9 operational. For example, what tax rates should be used and how would one measure depreciation? These are issues that the current BLS experimental user-cost series do not handle well. Improvement is needed; but I do not dwell on these issues here because there is a much broader issue to address. Would one expect a user-cost index, properly constructed along the lines of 9, to track the behavior of rental rates? The answer seems clearly to be no; and the reasons are quite instructive.
Because the current market interest rate and the one-period actual capital gains rate have such high weights in 9, the resulting user-cost series will be extremely volatile. (Some direct evidence on this is offered below.) Would market rental rates be this volatile if the houses now occupied by their owners were rented instead? I am quite confident that they would not be. Certainly the current market for rented dwellings exhibits no such volatility, and for good reasons. One is that the market for rental housing is not organized as a spot market, probably because the transactions costs of getting in and out are so immense. Even if there were no long-term contracts, it seems most unlikely that monthly rents would dance in tune with monthly fluctuations in interest rates or capital gains. The reason is that the market for rented housing is one in which the rental rate equilibrates the flow supply of housing services with the flow demand. Suppose the stock demand for housing rises. Will rents jump immediately to "clear the market?" It is not likely. Instead, the prices of houses will increase enough (with corresponding effects on the user cost) to equate the stock demand with the (temporarily fixed) stock supply. Tobin's q will therefore be pushed above unity, encouraging the construction of more houses. The disequilibrium will persist until enough new houses have been built to reduce q back to unity. Rents might rise slightly during the adjustment period (a housing shortage), but they would not be expected to rise much.
These "hunches" are backed by direct evidence that the user costs are too volatile to represent market rents. In his paper in this issue, Hendershott calculates a user-cost series for rented dwellings that is conceptually similar to my equation 9. When this series is compared with the actual observed rental rates in that market (see his figure 1), it is clear that the former is far more volatile than the latter.
How much differently would the CPI have behaved in recent years if the BLS had adopted user cost in place of its current treatment of homeownership? The BLS currently has two experimental user-cost series; one uses current mortgage interest rates, the other, a fifteen-year weighted average of mortgage rates. However, the weighting scheme, which reflects the age distribution of existing mortgages, is heavily front-loaded: 31 percent of the weight is on the first 1 1/2 years and 69 percent is on the first 51/2 years. So the two series behave more similarly in practice than might be expected. The recent behavior of the two series is summarized under "user cost" in table 6 .
In 1977 and 1978, substitution of user cost for current BLS methods would have led to a smaller measured inflation rate, as expected. Under present concepts, the rates of increase of homeownership costs in the two years were 9.2 and 12.4 percent, respectively. Under a user-cost measure, the corresponding rates would instead have been 2.5 and 5.7 percent using current mortgage rates or 0.4 and -1.1 percent using average mortgage rates. These are large differences. Using average mortgage rates would have reduced the overall inflation rates by about 1 percentage point in 1977 and 2 points in 1978, making them even slightly lower than under rental equivalence.
The tables turn in 1979 and 1980, however. The user-cost measures actually increased at a more rapid rate than the official homeownership index, and much faster than the rental equivalence measure. As expected, the user-cost measures seem to be inherently volatile. The volatility problem becomes particularly acute in periods, like the current one, in which the level of the user-cost series is quite low so that relatively small absolute changes in user cost correspond to very large relative changes. This follows from 9. For simplicity, suppose that u, T, and 8 are all constant, and that all mortgages bear the current interest rate, r(t) in each period. Then the user-cost formula becomes
C(t) = P(t)[(l -u)(r(t) + r) + r-(t)].
A straightforward calculation shows that the percentage change in user cost from one period to the next is given by
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As C(t) becomes very small, the weights attached to the changes in in- This is where I came in. The perceived problem with the current CPI treatment of homeownership is that it is too volatile. Yet a user-cost series is likely to be even more volatile.21 The basic problem is inherent in using an interest rate as a component of a price index, and it turns out that usercost measures assign even more importance to interest rates than does the current CPI methodology.
Conclusions: Improving the Measurement of Homeownership Costs
Nearly everyone seems to agree that the CPI provides a seriously distorted picture of changes in homeownership costs. Can it really make sense to state, as the index does, that the cost of homeownership rose at a 25 percent annual rate between December 1979 and June 1980 and then fell at an annual rate of 17 percent between June 1980 and July 1980? Can the picture be brought into sharper focus and the CPI tamed?
There are three basic candidates and none of them is especially appealing. First, marginal improvements could be made in BLS procedures without in any way overhauling the basic conceptual framework that is currently in use. Among these would be to eliminate unnecessary lags in processing the mortgage rate data of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the FHA house price data; to use data on home prices from a broader, more representative sample than the FHA data; to replace the current 20. See, for example, the paper by Patric Hendershott in this issue. 21. The extreme volatility of the user-cost series is mitigated in part by the lower weight (only about 0.10 to 0.11) accorded homeownership when the experimental user-cost formulations are employed. In 1979, for example, overall CPI inflation would have been about the same as in the official index if user cost with current mortgage rates had been used, and 1.2 points lower under user cost with average mortgage rates (see table 6 ). mortgage interest rate with a long-term weighted average; and to reduce the weight on homeownership, which seems excessive on several grounds. These changes would not move the CPI's treatment of homeownership costs any closer to the treatment suggested by economic analysis, but they would at least reduce what now appears to be excessive volatility in homeownership costs. This is a prescription for powdering a nose when plastic surgery is probably needed.
Second, an effort could be made to develop a sample of rented dwellings that matches as closely as possible the universe of owner-occupied dwellings. As noted above, the job probably cannot be done perfectly. But the remaining shortcomings in the sample might be overcome by appropriate reweighting. It is quite possible that this technique, while far from the perfect solution, will be as close to a "true" measure of rental equivalence as we are likely to achieve, and this approach needs to be explored.
A third candidate is user cost. If measured correctly, user cost can indeed tell us how much it cost typical homeowners to use their homes in a given month. But that hardly makes it the ideal solution. I have argued at some length that a user-cost series is bound to be far more volatile than the rents that would emerge if the owner-occupied housing market were somehow transformed into a rental market.
But what does this mean? Market rents probably would be much less volatile than user cost. Yet user cost is the truer measure of the literal cost of living in one's house if it is owned rather than rented. The problem is that homeowners have a split personality-they are both consumers of housing services and investors in houses as assets. The two roles are inextricably bound together for owner-occupied houses, virtually by definition. So it is not surprising that people have difficulty deciding which measure of homeownership costs is "correct."
Consider the example in which Dr. Jekyll rents a house from Mr. Hyde. The cost of owning the house for a month is C(t); implicitly, this is what Mr. Hyde pays. But it is not what he charges Dr. Jekyll. Dr. Jekyll's rent stream, call it R (t), will over a long period of time be equal in present value to Mr. Hyde's user-cost stream. But R (t) will reflect few if any of the monthly "blips" in C(t). Mr. Hyde, the entrepreneur, bears all the risk while Dr. Jekyll pays a steady monthly rent. There seem, then, to be two choices with claims to being correct. On the one hand, perhaps Mr. Hyde should be ignored; he is, in any case, an investor rather than a consumer. Then R(t), rental equivalence, should enter Dr. Jekyll's cost-of-living index. On the other hand, Jekyll and Hyde do inhabit the same body (if at different times!) and thus perhaps they should be amalgamated and a cost of living should be computed for the pair. In this case one is led to user cost, C(t).
It is now the time to choose. I think the current treatment can be eliminated from serious contention. One need only think about the purposes for which the CPI is used to conclude that what is needed is a cost-ofliving index based on a service-flow concept of housing, not a current acquisition price index that treats durable purchases as instantaneous consumption. Apart from the use of the CPI by economists (a small and unrepresentative group), it is used mostly for indexing various types of contracts to the price level-wages, social security benefits, and so on. There are two further items to add. First, because property taxes are deductible in calculating personal income taxes, the net cost of these levies to the homeowner is Tr(1 -u)P(t ). Second, there is price appreciation to be reckoned with. If, between period t -1 and period t., the price per unit of housing increases at a proportional rate 7(t.) but the house depreciates (in terms of physical units) at a proportional rate 8, then capital gains net of depreciation are (7(t) -8)P(t.). Capital gains are assumed to be untaxed.
Putting all these items together, the user cost at time t. for a mortgage closed at time zero is No one knows whether earlier estimates of the substitution bias, which have invariably found it quite small, will hold up in the current inflation. The degree of substitution bias depends, however, on the amount of relative price change-given substitution elasticities-and not just on the rate of inflation. Discussion SOME discussants elaborated on the theoretical ambiguity inherent in defining a cost-of-living index. If used to deflate income, the appropriate construction depended on what concept of income it was meant to deflate. Edward Denison pointed out that, subject to the unavoidable index number problems, there is a price index that would answer the usual question for any specified measure of consumption: how much does current dollar consumption have to rise to hold constant dollar consumption unchanged? Joseph Pechman noted that this is the question implied in using the CPI to index retirement benefits and to index or otherwise inform wage and salary adjustments, and is also the way the CPI is interpreted in political debate and in public discussions of inflation. Although it would certainly make sense to alter the market basket of consumption in constructing the price index for social security retirees or for some other particular group, the main index ought to answer Denison's question for our best measure of consumption. The panel agreed that the current treatment of homeownership in the CPI is conceptually incorrect for deflating any realistic concept of consumption; and, in practice, it leads to far greater volatility in the CPI than a more appropriate measure would display.
C(t) = r(1 -u)B(t) + r*(t)(l -u)[P(t) -B(t)] + r(1 -u)P(t) -[r(t) -b]P(t) = P(t)[(l -ii)(r*(t) + r) + a -r(t)] + (1 -u)(r -r*(t))B(t).
Substituting equation 10 for B(t) gives
